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A Conversation with Bob Hankins
Taking Stock of the District Banking Industry OnTheRecord
Dallas Fed Senior Vice President Bob Hankins, who oversees bank regulation in the 
Eleventh District, discusses the district’s banks—from the risks posed by today’s faltering 
housing markets to lessons from the turbulence of the 1980s.
Q: Nationally, a lot has been written about the 
housing downturn and financial market stresses. 
How have they affected Texas banks?
A: So far, Texas banks haven’t been affected 
much  by  the  housing  slump.  That’s  prob-
ably due to the fact that the state’s real estate 
markets haven’t seen the kinds of difficulties 
other regions have.
If you look at banking profiles, you’ll 
see some clear differences between the Elev-
enth District and the rest of the country in 
terms of asset quality. As things stand, only 
about one-half of 1 percent of the mortgages 
held by district banks aren’t being paid on 
schedule. That’s a better track record than 
banks in the rest of the country, where a 
little over 1 percent of mortgages aren’t cur-
rent.
But I like to think that there’s more to 
the strength of the district’s banking sector 
than just the region’s economy. Though the 
economy is responsible for much of the rela-
tive better performance, it also comes down 
to having enough bankers around who re-
member the hard times of the 1980s.
Q: What do you remember about the 1980s?
A: I’ve been in banking regulation for over 
34 years, 28 of them here in Dallas. I like 
to say that I arrived on the scene in 1979 
and had two good years before we saw the 
worst crisis in banking since the Great De-
pression. 
Between  1982  and  1993,  the  district 
had more than 600 banks fail. In the peak 
years of 1988 and 1989, Texas banks alone 
accounted for about two-thirds of all failures 
in the country, and Texas banks recorded 
losses  for  four  straight  years,  from  1986 
through 1989.  Only one of the top 10 bank-
ing  organizations—Cullen/Frost—survived 
the crisis intact.
As bad as all that sounds, it helps to 
understand that the number of failures was 
inflated  because  Texas  still  barred  branch 
banking at the time. So in a multibank hold-
ing company, one failure could take down 
all of the banks in the organization. 
Q: What caused the crisis?
A: It was really a confluence of a number of 
things. It started with the bust in energy pric-
es. The energy crisis was followed closely by 
the real estate crisis. At the time, it seemed 
the banks that weren’t exposed to the en-
ergy sector were exposed to real estate. It 
didn’t help that we saw the removal of some 
tax laws that had benefited the real estate 
market. The deregulation that took place in 
the savings and loan industry only served to 
exacerbate real estate investors’ euphoria.
Q: Does anything about today’s environment 
take you back to the 1980s?
A: What I talk about today and have been 
talking  about  for  over  five  years  now  is 
banks’ exposure to commercial real estate. 
I’m not making any judgments but simply 
looking at the numbers. Right now, commer-
cial real estate makes up some 28 percent 
of district banks’ assets. That’s significantly 
greater than the 16 percent we saw at the 
height of our real estate problems in 1987.
Although I recognize that banks have 
better  risk  management  practices  in  place 
than they did in the 1980s, it doesn’t stop me 
from worrying. If we have a major economic 
downturn,  banks’  exposure  to  commercial 
real estate could have a significant impact 
on the overall condition of the industry. 
Q: How did the 1980s crisis change banking 
regulation?
A: At the state level, the crisis helped provide 
the impetus for changes in Texas’ banking 
landscape. Because the industry was in such 
a  weakened  condition,  we  ended  up  let-
ting out-of-state organizations acquire Texas 
banks.  That  started  in  1988,  when  NCNB 
bought First Republic. Many others followed, 
leaving Texas without any big homegrown 
banks. 
For the nation, the FDIC Improvement “If you look at banking profiles, you’ll see some 
clear differences between the Eleventh District 
and the rest of the country in terms of asset quality.”
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Act was passed in 1991, introducing a num-
ber of reforms that address such issues as the 
safety and soundness of the insurance funds, 
prompt regulatory action and the need to re-
solve failures in the most cost-efficient way. 
Another  important  change  came  with 
the passage in 1994 of the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. 
It’s a mouthful to say, but the law for the 
first time allowed banks to set up branches 
outside  their  home  states—although Texas 
didn’t opt in to the law change until 1998.
Since  then,  the  number  of  district   
banks has fallen from about 900 to about 
650, but customers still have ample opportu-
nity to receive banking services. The number 
of branches in the district has grown from 
3,500 to more than 6,000.
By the way, vestiges of the old system 
are still with us. Even today, institutions can’t 
come  into  Texas  with  de  novo  branches. 
They  have  to  acquire  an  existing  charter 
that’s at least five years old and convert it 
to a branch. 
Q:  Are  there  other  ways  to  set  up  shop  in 
Texas?
A: A bank can also relocate to Texas by es-
tablishing a new charter here. The most re-
cent example of this is Comerica, which is 
merging its current Michigan charter into its 
new Texas charter. 
Comerica—the nation’s 21st-largest bank, 
with assets of about $60 billion—is by far the 
largest bank to relocate to the state, and its 
arrival sends a strong signal of the viability 
of the Texas banking market.
Q: What will your jurisdiction encompass after 
Comerica finalizes its move?
A: Today, the Dallas Fed directly supervises 
38 state-chartered banks that have elected to 
be members of the Federal Reserve System. 
We  refer  to  them  as  state  member  banks. 
As of the end of the second quarter, those 
38 banks represented 6 percent of the 679 
banks headquartered in the Eleventh District 
and  10  percent  of  the  387  state-chartered 
banks headquartered here. 
Those  38  banks  held 
$19.2 billion in assets—10 
percent of the district’s to-
tal banking assets of $194.7 
billion  and  20  percent  of 
its state-chartered banking 
assets of $94.9 billion. We 
also  supervise  about  450 
bank  holding  companies 
and 30 agencies and repre-
sentative offices of foreign 
banks.
After  the  Comerica 
move,  that  $19.2  billion 
figure  will  bump  up  to 
nearly $80 billion. So you 
can see it’s quite important 
for the district.
Q: Are there other risks to 
the banking system outside 
of real estate?
A: Banks typically borrow or take in deposits 
at lower short-term rates and then lend out 
that money longer term at higher rates. The 
difference between those two rates is what 
they pocket and can affect their profitability. 
The challenge for banks in recent years 
has been the narrowing gap between these 
two  rates,  putting  pressure  on  their  profit 
margins.  The  longer  that  environment  has 
persisted,  the  more  I  worry  about  banks 
struggling to sustain their earnings. What I 
have been cautioning against is letting the 
squeezed profit margins lead to too much 
cost cutting in such areas as internal controls, 
compliance, loan review and personnel. 
On top of that, I worry that banks are 
having a hard time attracting the right talent 
to their management ranks. But, then, I am 
paid to worry.
Q: Does the recent rate cut by the Fed imply 
that  banks  are  entering  a  better  earnings 
environment?
A: In theory, declining interest rates should 
be beneficial to the banking industry. But in 
reality, it depends on an individual bank’s 
position. If a bank’s liabilities reprice faster 
than its assets, then that bank’s net interest 
margin  will  increase,  and  so  should  earn-
ings.  If, on the other hand, a bank’s assets 
reprice quicker than its liabilities, its profits 
might fall.
If the industry as a whole plays true to 
form—funding  long-term  assets,  or  loans, 
with  short-term  liabilities,  or  deposits—it’s 
probably better off today than it was before 
the Fed cut interest rates.